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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 11, 2001, the landscape of international relations 
dramatically shifted.1 It was impossible to predict how the ensuing 
 1. See, e.g., Guy Raz, Defining the War on Terror, NPR, Sept. 1, 2012, 
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“War on Terror”2 would necessarily impact domestic treatment of 
international law, influence detainment procedure for alleged “enemy 
combatants,”3 or compromise United States compliance with the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture (“UNCAT” or “the 
Convention”).4  
Cases of first impression arose that challenged a newfound and 
newly respected broad Executive power in light of growing national 
security concerns.5 Though the Executive traditionally has had 
unfettered power to act during wartime, the extent of those powers in 
the extradition context has recently broadened and become subject to 
dangerous deferential treatment by the U.S. federal courts, despite 
affirmative UNCAT nonrefoulement obligations that indicate a need 
for Executive review.6 Judicial deference to the Executive has 
reached the point of noncompliance with UNCAT, due in large part 
to critical misreading of relevant precedent and recent legislation.7 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6416780 (explaining that 
the “war on terror” is difficult to define because it has an ambiguous beginning and 
end and has been waged against multiple adversaries). 
 2. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the 
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (“Our war on 
terror . . . will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, 
stopped, and defeated.”). 
 3. DEP’T. OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 2310.01E, DETAINEE PROGRAM (Sept. 5, 
2006), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/231001p.pdf 
(defining “enemy combatant” as “a person engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners during an armed conflict”). 
 4. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, 
39th Sess. Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter UNCAT]. See 
generally MANFRED NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 101–102 (Philip Alston & Vaughan Lowe, eds., 
2008) (explaining that the Committee Against Torture has become especially 
vigilant in monitoring United States use of diplomatic assurances in extradition 
cases following September 11, 2001). 
 5. See generally Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay have a right to habeas corpus); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 
(2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing due process claims for failure to specify culpable action 
by federal officials of a Canadian citizen whom the United States deported to 
Syria, where he was tortured). 
 6. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
(limiting Executive deference during wartime by holding that the seizure of a steel 
mill to avoid labor disruptions was outside the scope of the Executive’s power). 
 7. See, e.g., Wartime and Emergency Powers: The War on Terror, in JUDGING 
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The modern task of the courts is now to effectuate a delicate 
balance between deference to the Executive on matters of 
international concern, on the one hand, and to comply with basic 
principles of international law as codified in UNCAT and 
implemented via domestic legislation on the other.8 The palpable 
difficulties presented by the clash between domestic law and 
international policy, once a realm of advancement,9 have caused 
derogation from UNCAT nonrefoulement obligations.10  
The United States adopted most of its UNCAT obligations via the 
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (“FARRA”), section 
2242 of which implements UNCAT’s nonrefoulement mandate.11 
Recent extradition jurisprudence, however—characterized by the use 
of Executive assurances and foreclosure of judicial review—
demonstrates noncompliance with the UNCAT nonrefoulement 
mandate and the promise not to “transfer to torture.”12  
This comment will argue that the United States’ implementation of 
EXECUTIVE POWER: SIXTEEN SUPREME COURT CASES THAT HAVE SHAPED THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 161, 164 (Richard J. Ellis, ed., 2009) (examining the 
breadth of contemporary executive power, and explaining that the questions facing 
the justices regarding this power following September 11, 2001 were of the most 
salient of all wartime jurisprudence). 
 8. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
277, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231) [hereinafter FARRA]. 
 9. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008) (holding that 
noncitizen detainees have a constitutional right to habeas review and that any 
attempt to strip detainees of this review without a sufficient substitute will be held 
unconstitutional). 
 10. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, at 185 (explaining that the 
Committee Against Torture feared a gap between policy and local implementation, 
partially because of the potential inadequacy of domestic legislation). 
 11. FARRA, supra note 8, § 2242; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(1) (2012) 
(providing regulations for the obligations set forth in FARRA and formally 
defining torture for purposes of implementing the UNCAT nonrefoulement 
mandate). 
 12. See Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas, 683 F.3d 952, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2012) (en 
banc) (Berzon, J., concurring) (per curiam) (asserting that a pro forma “barebones 
declaration” by the Secretary of State in the form of an executive assurance that a 
detainee will not be tortured upon extradition is a wholly insufficient method of 
compliance with UNCAT); see, e.g., Jeffrey H. Fisher, Detainee Transfers After 
Munaf: Executive Deference and the Convention Against Torture, 43 GA. L. REV. 
953, 958 (2009) (explaining that certain commentators criticize the evaluation 
process and argue that because individual rights are implicated, detainees should 
be entitled to meaningful judicial review under FARRA). 
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its nonrefoulement obligation is patently inconsistent with the anti-
torture goals of UNCAT.13 It will further argue that detainees raising 
claims under UNCAT and FARRA should have access to meaningful 
review beyond an Executive assurance that the detainee will not be 
subject to torture.14  
Part II of this comment will include a foundational discussion of 
the “meaningful review” standard and recent extradition and transfer 
case law, as well as the implementation of UNCAT’s Article 3 
nonrefoulement mandate. Part III will argue that the United States, in 
its handling of extradition cases, is in derogation of its UNCAT 
nonrefoulement obligations vis-à-vis a disallowance of substantive 
judicial review. Part IV will suggest and conclude that the United 
States might solve this compliance problem by eliminating the 
ambiguity in FARRA and accepting the necessary role of federal 
judicial review to comply with its obligations under the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY AND CONTEMPLATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
1. A Brief History of the Creation and Goals of the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture 
The United Nations Convention Against Torture aims to “make 
more effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.”15 
UNCAT Article 1 defines “torture” as  
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . . punishing him 
 13. See Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, Khouzam v. Chertoff: Torture, Removal, and the 
Rule of Noninquiry, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 239–40 (2009) (using the 
Third Circuit’s decision in an immigration removal case to explain that the use of 
the “rule of non-inquiry” is unique to the United States, to the point that foreign 
guidance should be instructive). 
 14. See Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 963–66 (Tallman, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that habeas jurisdiction is available but the claim is foreclosed on its 
merits based on the Secretary’s assurance and that the rule of non-inquiry prohibits 
the judiciary from examining Executive extradition decisions). 
 15. UNCAT, supra note 4, Annex. 
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for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed . . . when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the 
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity.16  
The primary purpose of UNCAT is to reinforce the longstanding 
prohibition against torture in customary international law.17 This 
prohibition relates solely to cases of torture that occur in a 
governmental setting and implicates the actions of public officials or 
other individuals acting in a representative or official capacity.18 
UNCAT was originally formed as an enforcement mechanism for 
the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Any Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment.19 In 1977, the General Assembly 
requested that the Commission on Human Rights begin a draft 
convention against torture;20 the following year, the Swedish 
 16. Id. art. 1. See generally The Summary prepared by the Secretary-General in 
accordance with Commission Resolution 18 (XXXIV) containing the comments 
received from Governments on the Draft Articles of the Convention on Torture, 
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1314 (1978) (containing the United States’ agreement during the initial 
draft stages of UNCAT indicating the difficulty in separating “delineate torture” 
from other cruel acts, and thus its support for a broad definition). 
 17. See HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST 
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR 
PUNISHMENT 1 (1988) [hereinafter BURGERS & DANELIUS] (explaining that 
UNCAT’s real purpose is to strengthen an already existing prohibition of torture 
via additional supportive measures); see also Ashley Deeks, Promises Not to 
Torture Diplomatic Assurances in U.S. Courts, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 6, 14 n.6 (2008), available at 
http://www.asil.org/files/ASIL-08-DiscussionPaper.pdf [hereinafter ASIL 
DISCUSSION] (noting, in support of the prima facie goals of UNCAT, that the plain 
language of the treaty contains a nonrefoulement obligation, unlike the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights). 
 18. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 17, at 1 (indicating that UNCAT 
seeks to influence the behavior of those who are apt to become involved in 
situations in which such practices might occur). 
 19. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. 
Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N.GOAR, 30th Sess. Supp. No.34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 
9, 1975). 
 20. G.A. Res. 32/62, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/32/62 (Dec. 8, 1977). 
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government submitted a preliminary draft for the Convention.21 From 
these preliminary drafts, perpetual international momentum led to the 
complete creation of UNCAT in 1984 to which 147 States are now 
party.22 The United States Senate ratified UNCAT in 1990.23 The 
contemporary Convention provides a universal definition of torture 
and addresses complex enforcement issues that arise in the 
extradition context.24  
Consistent with its aim to effectuate a uniform international 
combative effort to eradicate torture, Article 5(1) of UNCAT 
provides that “each State Party shall take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses referred to in 
[A]rticle 4” when the alleged offender has even the most attenuated 
connection to that state.25 Parties to UNCAT are in current 
disagreement about whether nonrefoulement obligations apply 
extraterritorially.26 
 21. Draft International Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, submitted by Sweden, U.N. ESCOR, 
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1285 (1978) [hereinafter Swedish Draft 
Convention]. 
 22. U.N. Rights Expert Urge States to Comply with Convention Against 
Torture, U.N. NEWS, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36507#.UfgEzY21Gcw (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2013); see also RACHEL MURRAY ET AL., THE OPTIONAL 
PROTOCOL TO THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 139–42 (2011) 
[hereinafter MURRAY ET AL.] (discussing implementation methods that might 
operate to increase compliance with the guidelines in UNCAT now that the treaty 
is widely ratified). 
 23. Convention Against Torture: Hearing on S.718 Before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 101st Cong., 2nd Session (1990) [hereinafter Hearings]; 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Suspension Clause After 
St. Cyr, 113 YALE L.J. 2007, 2012–37 (2004) [hereinafter Vladeck, Non-Self-
Executing Treaties]. 
 24. For a discussion on the jurisdictional implications of UNCAT, see AHCENE 
BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR 
ENFORCEMENT 171, 175–81 (1999). 
 25. UNCAT, supra note 4, art. 5; see MURRAY ET AL., supra note 22, at 3 
(explaining that the jurisdictional article requires that States extend their 
jurisdiction in various situations “reflecting the well-established jurisdictional 
‘heads’ of ‘territoriality’, ‘nationality’, and ‘passive personality’”). 
 26. See List of Issues to Be Considered During the Examination of the Second 
Periodic Report of the United States of America: Response of the United States of 
America, 31, 36, 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/docs/AdvanceVersions/listUSA36_En.p
df (last visited Aug. 21, 2013) (explaining that the United States has taken the 
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2. The Article 3 Nonrefoulement Prohibition: “Transfer to Torture” 
Article 3 of UNCAT contains an unqualified nonrefoulement 
obligation.27 Specifically, the principle of nonrefoulement 
contributes to international anti-torture efforts by forbidding nations 
to extradite or transfer when the detainee might be subject to torture 
in the receiving country.28 Article 3, in its entirety, provides that,  
(1) No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. (2) For the purpose of 
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities 
shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where 
applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of 
gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.29 
Known as the “nonrefoulement clause” of the Convention, Article 
3 embodies a jus cogens of international law: nations may not 
“transfer to torture” and nations of detainment must ensure that the 
detainee will not be subject to torture upon transfer.30 This clause 
began as Article 4 of the original Swedish draft convention, which 
provided that “no state party may expel or extradite a person to a 
state where there are reasonable grounds to believe” that he may be 
subject to torture.31 UNCAT Article 3 now provides the same 
obligation.32 
position that the nonrefoulement prohibition does not apply to individuals outside 
of United States territory); see also Robert L. Newmark, Non-Refoulement Run 
Afoul: The Questionable Legality of Extraterritorial Repatriation Programs, 71 
WASH. U. L. REV. 833, 851–53 (1993) (explaining the historical limitations of U.S. 
nonrefoulement policy, compared to other countries). 
 27. UNCAT, supra note 4, art. 3. See generally NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra 
note 4, at 148 (stating that nonrefoulement obligations are absolute); Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1(F), July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
(providing another source of law for the absolute principle of nonrefoulement and 
further enforcing the notion that nonrefoulement principles are affirmative). 
 28. ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 6. 
 29. UNCAT, supra note 4, art. 3. 
 30. ASIL Discussion, supra note 17, at 7 (explaining that despite 
disagreements among nations regarding the breadth and applicability of 
nonrefoulement principles and obligations, some states view nonrefoulement as a 
customary international law norm embedded in the prohibition against torture). 
 31. Swedish Draft Convention, supra note 21, art. 4. 
 32. UNCAT, supra note 4, art. 3; see NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, at 
151–52 (noting that the United States limited its obligations to explicit “torture” 
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The nonrefoulement prohibition is absolute, but there is 
disagreement among nations as to what triggers nonrefoulement.33 
When the United States Senate ratified UNCAT, it interpreted the 
Article 3 phrase “where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture” to mean “if 
it is more likely than not that he would be tortured.”34 There is a 
customary international law presumption against torture; thus, one 
argument for the Article 3 nonrefoulement prohibition has 
traditionally been that nonrefoulement itself is a customary 
international law norm.35 Notably, the United States disagrees with 
this view.36  
B. AFFIRMATIVE UNITED STATES’ NONREFOULEMENT 
OBLIGATIONS: THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS REFORM AND 
RESTRUCTURING ACT 
1. United States Nonrefoulement Obligations Under FARRA 
UNCAT is a non-self executing treaty, meaning that it provides no 
substantive rights without domestic ratification.37 The United States 
has adopted most of its UNCAT obligations via FARRA, including 
its nonrefoulement obligation in its entirety.38 Though the United 
States has held that its FARRA obligations do not extend 
extraterritorially, it remains United States policy not to send any 
detainee to a place where it is more likely than not that the individual 
and nothing less). 
 33. See ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 7 (indicating that other State 
parties to UNCAT believe the United States’ “more likely than not” 
nonrefoulement torture standard makes it easier for the United States to transfer 
detainees without appropriate review). 
 34. S. REP. NO. 101-30, at 3 (1990) (containing the Resolution of Advice and 
Consent to Ratification with the “more likely than not” standard) (emphasis 
added). But see ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 7 (citing the ICRC view that 
nonrefoulement obligations apply in a broad range of contexts). 
 35. See ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 7 (indicating that nonrefoulement 
is an a accepted norm under international law). 
 36. See id. at 7 (explaining that despite the United States’ uncontested legal 
obligation not to transfer in the face of torture, it allows itself leeway in light of its 
opinion that, for example, the principle does not apply extraterritorially). 
 37. See generally Vladeck, Non-Self-Executing Treaties, supra note 23 
(explaining that there is much debate over the availability of habeas review 
because of the non-self executing nature of the treaty). 
 38. FARRA, supra note 8, § 2242. 
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will be tortured.39 The State Department enacted regulations pursuant 
to FARRA to implement domestic obligations under Article 3 of 
UNCAT. The regulations provide, in relevant part, that in cases 
where “allegations relating to torture are made . . . appropriate policy 
and legal offices review and analyze information relevant to the case 
in preparing a recommendation to the Secretary as to whether or not 
to sign the surrender warrant.”40 
Detainees’ affirmative UNCAT rights are contained in FARRA, 
which is the domestic source of the United States’ “policy . . . not to 
expel [or] extradite . . . any person to a country in which there are 
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is 
physically present in the United States.”41 The regulations 
accompanying FARRA contemplate executive deference in 
nonrefoulement situations.42 While they do not explicitly discuss 
diplomatic or executive assurances, their repeated reference to the 
Secretary’s unilateral authority has served as the foundation for the 
use of assurances and the exclusion of judicial review in extradition 
and transfer determinations.43 Because FARRA is a holistic adoption 
 39. See ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 7–8 (noting that while the United 
States takes this position, other states disagree, and that a number of academics 
regard nonrefoulement as a customary international law norm embedded in the 
CIL prohibition against torture, and assert that nonrefoulement obligations attach 
in any situation in which “the act in question would be attributable to the State 
whether this occurs, or would occur, within the territory of the State or 
elsewhere”). But see John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1183, 1229 (2004) (“However, the Convention is generally inapplicable to 
transfers effected in the context of the current armed conflict because it has no 
extraterritorial effect . . . and, hence, cannot apply to . . . prisoners detained outside 
of U.S. territory at Guantánamo Bay territory at Guantánamo Bay . . . .”). 
 40. 22 C.F.R. § 95.3(a) (2012); see also id. § 95.4 (“Decisions of the Secretary 
concerning surrender of fugitives for extradition are matters of executive discretion 
not subject to judicial review.”). 
 41. FARRA, supra note 8, § 2242; 22 C.F.R. § 95.2(b) (providing that to fulfill 
UNCAT obligations, the State Department must determine if a detainee facing 
extradition is “more likely than not to be tortured”). 
 42. 22 C.F.R. § 95 (allowing the Secretary to decide whether to extradite an 
individual to the requesting state, deny the extradition, or extradite subject to 
conditions met through diplomatic assurances). 
 43. 22 C.F.R. § 95.4; see Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 379 F.3d 1075, 1087 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (finding, in light of the Government position that the language of 
FARRA and the rule of non-inquiry preclude judicial review, the structure of 
UNCAT and the legislative intent behind FARRA indicate that the Secretary’s 
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of UNCAT obligations, the United States has assumed the absolute 
nature of the nonrefoulement mandate.44 
2. FARRA’s Provision of an Avenue for Review and the INS v. St. 
Cyr Habeas Standard45 
Despite FARRA’s substantive purpose of providing grounds for 
relief under UNCAT, it is unclear whether individuals in extradition 
or transfer proceedings may successfully invoke FARRA’s 
nonrefoulement mandate offensively in civil litigation; that is, 
whether a detainee has a substantive challenge to the Executive’s 
determination that may be enforced by a habeas writ.46 Federal courts 
have said that FARRA does not strip them of their already-conferred 
statutory habeas jurisdiction47 in UNCAT/FARRA claims. Still, 
courts have held that the same judicial inquiry is barred based on 
curious statutory interpretation.48  
torture determination was never meant to be reviewable). But see Mironescu v. 
Costner, 480 F.3d 664, 671–73 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted) (holding 
that the rule of non-inquiry did not bar courts from reviewing torture concerns in 
habeas petitions specifically answering the “straightforward” question of “whether 
a fugitive would likely face torture in the requesting country,” and opining in dicta 
that in enacting FARRA, Congress intended to preclude judicial review of UNCAT 
claims but that petitioner here had not argued that denying him the opportunity to 
present his UNCAT/FARRA claims on habeas review violated the Suspension 
Clause). 
 44. S. REP. NO. 101-30 (1990). See generally NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra 
note 4, at 147 (asserting that “[t]he Committee [Against Torture] has explicitly 
stated that nonrefoulement must be recognized as a peremptory norm under 
international law, and not merely as a principle enshrined in Article 3 [UN]CAT,” 
and noting that article three is influenced by the protection against refoulement in 
Article thirty-three of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees). 
 45. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
 46. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Why the “Munaf Sequels” Matter: A Primer on 
FARRA, REAL ID, and the Role of the Courts in Transfer/Extradition Cases, 
LAWFARE (June 12, 2012, 9:00 AM) http://www.lawfareeblog.com/2012/06/why-
the-munaf-sequels-matter/ [hereinafter Vladeck, Why the “Munaf Sequels” Matter] 
(theorizing that although FARRA is a domestic implementation of UNCAT, those 
facing extradition have not been able to successfully invoke FARRA as a basis for 
relief through civil litigation, namely habeas claims). 
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a 
prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of laws or 
treaties of the United States.”). 
 48. See, e.g., Khouzam v. Chartoff, 549 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(interpreting § 2242(d) of FARRA to preclude judicial inquiry into either the 
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First, FARRA contains a jurisdictional clause that appears to 
vitiate judicial review both in statute and regulation.49 Section 
2242(d) of the statute provides that “nothing in this section shall be 
construed as providing any court jurisdiction to consider or review 
claims raised under the Convention or this section . . . except as part 
of the review of a final order of removal pursuant to [the immigration 
laws].”50 Thus, the FARRA jurisdiction clause does not divest courts 
of habeas jurisdiction; rather, it does not confer such jurisdiction.51 
Second, federal courts have interpreted the REAL ID Act of 2005 
(“REAL ID”),52 originally implemented to streamline appeals of 
removal decisions by limiting the availability of the habeas writ in 
the immigration context, to divest the courts of habeas jurisdiction 
outside of the immigration context.53 Despite REAL ID’s limitation 
to the immigrant context by its own admission, there has been 
significant debate over the function of FARRA in relation to habeas 
relief. Before REAL ID, courts did not have occasion to interpret 
FARRA as an avenue of fugitive relief because it was clear that 
detainees facing extradition or transfer could invoke 
regulations adopted to implement the statute or claims raised under the statute). 
 49. FARRA, supra note 8, § 2242(d); 22 C.F.R. § 95(4). 
 50. FARRA, supra note 8, § 2242(d). 
 51. See Vladeck, Why the “Munaf Sequels” Matter, supra note 46 (explaining 
that habeas jurisdiction is already conferred statutorily, so while logically FARRA 
does not confer jurisdiction, it also does not divest jurisdiction). Cf. Mironescu, 
480 F.3d at 674 (finding that FARRA strips courts of jurisdiction to review 
UNCAT claims). 
 52. REAL ID Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4) (2005) [hereinafter REAL ID Act] 
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory) . . . or any 
other habeas corpus provision . . . a petition for review filed with an appropriate 
court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive 
means for judicial review of any cause or claim under . . . [UNCAT], except as 
provided in subsection (e) of this section.”). 
 53. Compare Khouzam, 549 F.3d at 244 (allowing review of diplomatic 
assurances in the removal context despite the recognition that REAL ID 
“remove[d] habeas jurisdiction over this matter” because there is alternative 
jurisdiction to consider Khouzam’s arguments under that Act, but recognizing that 
this removal of habeas jurisdiction “would ordinarily present a Suspension Clause 
problem”), with Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 18, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2011), reissued 
sua sponte July 8, 2011 (holding that REAL ID divests federal courts of habeas 
jurisdiction in extradition and military transferee cases and that FARRA does not 
establish a right of judicial review, and also recognizing that “habeas corpus has 
been held not to be a valid means of inquiry into the treatment the relator is 
anticipated to receive in the requesting state”) (internal citation omitted). 
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FARRA/UNCAT as a basis for habeas review to challenge that 
decision.54 When REAL ID was codified, some circuits interpreted 
the statute as reversing what FARRA implementation had 
accomplished; that is, as an extension of UNCAT, a basis of relief 
for those facing extradition when there exists substantial belief that 
the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture.55 
Although the jurisdictional statement in FARRA does not satisfy 
the “superclear statement” standard promulgated in INS v. St. Cyr,56 
it is unclear whether there might be a meritorious claim for habeas 
review under FARRA.57 In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that a 
“clear, unambiguous, . . . express statement of congressional intent to 
preclude judicial consideration on habeas” is necessary for 
suspension of the writ.58 FARRA, then, has been conflated with 
REAL ID in such a manner that sidesteps UNCAT obligations in 
extradition cases as implemented via FARRA by allowing one 
unrelated statute to dictate the rights provided by another.59 
C. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR INTERPRETATION: FARRA AS 
AN ADEQUATE UNCAT SUBSET UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
The confusion surrounding FARRA becomes especially apparent 
when interpreting the statute as an UNCAT subset. For purposes of 
 54. See Steve Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit Vitiates the Suspension Clause, 
PRAWFSBLAWG, (June 22, 2011, 9:19 AM) available at 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/06/the-dc-circuit-vitiates-the-
suspension-clause.html [hereinafter Vladeck, D.C. Circuit Court Vitiates the 
Suspension Clause] (explaining that in Omar the D.C. Circuit offered a fractured 
interpretation of REAL ID and FARRA because REAL ID did not “repeal 
FARRA”; such interpretation undermines the right conferred under Boumediene of 
access to federal courts for habeas review). 
 55. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 23 (interpreting REAL ID to foreclose judicial 
review in extradition cases). 
 56. 533 U.S. 289, 327 (2001); see also Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 93–
94 (2010) (holding that “the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the 
petitioner’s entitlement to the writ” is one of the factors to consider when deciding 
whether to extend the writ under the Suspension Clause). 
 57. Infra Part III.C and accompanying text. 
 58. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314. 
 59. See, e.g., Omar, 646 F.3d at 17 (“[FARRA] provides a right to judicial 
review of conditions in the receiving country only in the immigration context, for 
aliens seeking review of a final order of removal.”) (emphasis added); see also 
infra Part III.B and accompanying text (exemplifying the Omar panel’s disregard 
for a right to be free from torture under international law). 
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UNCAT compliance, a textually analogous statute is insufficient.60 
The Vienna Convention provides principles upon which the two 
documents may be compared to determine the sufficiency of 
FARRA.61 Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that “[a] 
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose,” and requires 
interpretation and implementation consistent with its objectives.62 
Article 31(1) requires that a treaty be interpreted “in light of its 
object and purpose.”63 Further, Article 31(3)(c) provides that treaties 
should be interpreted within the context of “any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”64 
These interpretation tools are necessary to determine the efficacy of 
FARRA as a domestic implementation of UNCAT. 
D. THE EVOLUTION OF MEANINGFUL REVIEW AND BOUMEDIENE V. 
BUSH: THE SUPREME COURT DECLARES A RIGHT TO REVIEW 
While the Vienna Convention provides a useful starting point for 
analyzing United States noncompliance with its UNCAT 
nonrefoulement obligations, a holistic inquiry into whether FARRA 
is serving its purpose as a tool for torture eradication requires a basic 
knowledge of detainee rights. The constitutional rights afforded to 
detainees were extensively explored in the post-9/11 Guantanamo 
cases.65 In response to Congressional attempts to deprive detainees of 
habeas protection, the Supreme Court held that Congress had not 
presented a sufficient substitute for the writ, and that the Suspension 
Clause required an opportunity for meaningful review.66 
 60. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, at 151 (“It is not enough that a 
country has an extradition law in line with Article 3. Practice must also comply 
with Article 3 obligations.”). 
 61. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 62. Id. art. 31. 
 63. Id. art. 31(1). 
 64. Id. art. 31(3)(c). 
 65. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Insular Thinking About Habeas, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
BULL. 16, 17–18 (2012) [hereinafter Vladeck, Insular Thinking] (explaining the 
impact of the “insular” cases on subsequent litigation that implicates a right to 
substantive judicial review). 
 66. See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 
Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006) [hereinafter MCA] (establishing military tribunals to 
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From the beginning of the detainment of “enemy combatants,” 
federal courts and Congress have struggled with respect to the rights 
of wartime detainees seeking judicial review of their detention status 
and have attempted to give and take away relief from detainees.67 It 
is through this implicit conversation between Congress and the 
judiciary about how noncitizen detainees in United States custody 
should be handled during perpetual wartime that the “meaningful 
review” standard developed.68 
The Guantanamo cases shed light upon United States 
noncompliance with its nonrefoulement obligations under UNCAT 
because the rights ultimately afforded to the Guantanamo detainees 
are tantamount to the rights at stake in the extradition context.69 
Through these cases, the Court recognized that Congress may not 
divest the judiciary of its habeas jurisdiction, absent a sufficient 
hear suspected terrorist cases on the merits, effectively stripping federal courts of 
habeas jurisdiction); FARRA, supra note 8, § 1231 (providing a functionally 
similar mechanism to the MCA in that Congress indicated that it did not want the 
judiciary to review particular questions relating to the transfer of individuals as 
expressed in the Article 31 nonrefoulement clause). See generally War, Terror, 
and the Federal Courts, Ten Years After 9/11, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1253, 1263–68 
(June 2012) [hereinafter War, Terror, and the Federal Courts] (noting comments 
in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene that it is a mere coincidence 
that courts have not had to be particularly involved in answering questions about 
the separation of and limits on the government’s war powers, and reflecting his 
speculation that that may change). 
 67. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that Guantanamo 
detainees may file habeas petitions in United States courts); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that Congress’ recent legislative attempts to strip 
detainees of the right to habeas proceedings were unsuccessful with regard to 
pending wartime cases). But see Detainee Treatment Act, Title X, 2006 DOD 
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2680 (legislating Congress’s 
first substantive effort to strip U.S. federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas 
claims, as well as any other actions related to detainment, filed by Guantanamo 
detainees); MCA, supra note 66, § 7 (reflecting Congress’ response to the Court’s 
Hamdan holding, stripping detainees of the right to habeas providing that “no 
court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for 
a writ of habeas corpus . . . [by] an enemy combatant”). 
 68. See generally Vladeck, Insular Thinking, supra note 65. 
 69. See Caroline Wells Stanton, Rights and Remedies: Meaningful Habeas 
Corpus in Guantanamo, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891, 899, 903 (2010) 
(synthesizing relevant Supreme Court precedent to conclude that “the remedy of 
release is inseparable from the right to petition for habeas corpus” and explaining 
that without the power to order a remedy, the right to review of the Executive’s 
decision is really no right at all). 
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substitute for recourse, and that detainees are entitled to judicial 
review of their detainment under basic principles of both 
constitutional and international law.70 The debate in the Guantanamo 
cases was whether allowing detainees the constitutional privilege of 
habeas would have irreconcilable separation of powers 
implications.71 Despite these concerns, the Court landed on a right to 
“meaningful review.”72 
The Court noted in the Guantanamo cases that habeas is “an 
important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of 
detentions.”73 Much like concerns regarding FARRA’s foreclosure of 
extradition cases on their merits, in the Guantanamo cases the Court 
considered whether Congress might pass legislation preventing the 
judiciary from hearing the case of an accused military combatant 
before the military commission concerning detainment review took 
place.74 In both contexts, substantive relief is being denied. The 
Court consistently focused on the necessity of review and the lack of 
any operative substitute for protection.75  
 70. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780–84 (holding that a detainee is 
entitled to seek the writ of habeas corpus and that the available review procedures 
under the Detainee Treatment Act are an inadequate substitute). See generally 
Larry W. Yackle, Federal Courts: Habeas Corpus 14–15 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining 
that it is rare that Congress’ power to suspend the writ is acknowledged, and that 
such suspension has occurred only a handful of times throughout United States 
history). 
 71. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”); Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 24 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (opining that the Executive historically has autonomous decision-
making power during wartime). 
 72. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783; see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 557 (finding 
that military tribunals set up by the Bush administration were inapplicable to those 
detained prior to the legislation); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
(holding that habeas served as a necessary judicial check on the Executive’s 
powers granted under the Authorized Use of Military Force). 
 73. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536. Compare id. at 536–38 (retaining a check on the 
Executive’s power to detain suspected enemy combatants), with Omar, 646 F.3d at 
24 (precluding all judicial review in extradition cases despite UNCAT obligations). 
 74. See, e.g., Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 594–95 (finding that the Detainee Treatment 
Act unconstitutionally attempted to strip courts of their authority to review 
Executive detention). 
 75. Id. at 611–13 (concluding that while Hamdan may have committed a crime, 
the substance of that crime was outside the jurisdiction of the military commission, 
which was established to specifically address crimes of war). 
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Without defining the parameters of the privilege, the Court 
squarely held in Boumediene v. Bush that noncitizen detainees have a 
right, pursuant to the United States Constitution, to challenge their 
detentions through habeas corpus in federal courts, and that 
Congress’ attempts to create inadequate substitutes were 
unconstitutional.76 Under the Boumediene “meaningful review” 
standard, a noncitizen detainee is entitled to “a meaningful 
opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to the 
erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law.”77 Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene laid the groundwork for 
the subsequent FARRA cases.78 Though Justice Kennedy’s dicta left 
the scope of “meaningful review” largely undefined, his language 
supports the need for comprehensive review in the extradition 
context.79 In comparing post-conviction detention to executive 
detention, Justice Kennedy explained that “the need for collateral 
review” of an executive order is “most pressing,” and “the need for 
habeas corpus is more urgent.”80 This articulated need in 
Boumediene for meaningful review where an autonomous Executive 
decision is made demonstrates an incorporation of international law 
into domestic practice, and contributes to concern about the legality 
of contemporary extradition. 
 76. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 789 (declaring that Congress’ attempt to divest 
federal courts of habeas jurisdiction in section 7 of the MCA was unconstitutional 
without a replacement for habeas protection); see also Vladeck, Insular Thinking, 
supra note 65, at 19 and accompanying text. 
 77. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 728–29 (quoting Ins v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 
(2001)) (internal quotes omitted). See generally Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is 
Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT 385, 389, 393 (2010) (explaining Justice 
Kennedy’s habeas grant as “encompassing ‘a meaningful review of both the cause 
for detention and the Executive’s power to detain’”). 
 78. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780–800; see, e.g., Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 
509, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Griffith, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(Circuit Judge Griffith, concurring) (characterizing, in the transfer context, that 
“[t]he constitutional habeas protections extended to these petitioners by 
Boumediene [would] be greatly diminished, if not eliminated, without an 
opportunity to challenge the government’s assurances that their transfers will not 
result in continued detention on behalf of the United States”). 
 79. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 782–83; Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 961 
(coloring in Kennedy’s undefined “meaningful review” standard in an ordinary 
extradition circumstance with a solitary procedural right of ensuring the 
Secretary’s completed due diligence). 
 80. Id. at 783. 
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E. CROSSROADS: THE BOUMEDIENE FRAMEWORK AND ATTEMPTS 
TO INVOKE UNCAT RIGHTS IN THE EXTRADITION CONTEXT 
1. Adaptations of Article 3 and the Use of Executive Assurances 
An individual in extradition proceedings, often called a “relator” 
or a “fugitive,” has already been formally charged with a crime in the 
country requesting extradition.81 Extradition specifically involves 
surrendering the relator to that country so that the individual might 
face criminal sanctions.82 Though extradition-based claims differ 
from those detainment claims in the Boumediene line of cases,83 
doctrine has evolved such that the Executive’s role in extradition 
proceedings does not allow for judicial review.84 Instead, claims for 
relief are foreclosed on their merits by way of the rule of non-
inquiry, an archaic, judge-made standard grounded in United States 
sovereignty and the separation of powers.85 The rule prohibits a 
judicial check on the Executive’s assurance regarding whether it is 
“more likely than not” that a relator will be tortured upon transfer; 
these assurances are the United States’ sole vehicle of compliance 
with UNCAT under FARRA.86  
 81. John T. Parry, International Extradition, the Rule of Non-Inquiry, and the 
Problem of Sovereignty, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1973 (2010). 
 82. Id. at 2018 (explaining that extradition is “quintessentially a judicial 
process under [United States] law despite the executive functions of review and 
surrender”). 
 83. See Declaration of Richard Pierre-Prosper, ¶¶ 1–9, Abdah v. Bush, No. Civ. 
04-1254(HHK), 2005 WL 711814, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter 
Prosper Declaration] (defining detainee transfer protocol as the Department of 
Defense’s decision to transfer a detainee to another government for either release 
or ongoing detention, and further explaining that detainees often fear torture based 
on poor human rights records). 
 84. See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 961 (foreclosing a claim on the 
merits based solely on an executive assurance). 
 85. See Parry, supra note 81, at 1995–96 (clarifying that the rule of non-inquiry 
exists as a matter of tradition and allows courts to “compile reassuring string cites 
of cases in which [courts] refused . . . to inquire into possible violations of human 
rights”). 
 86. See generally BOULESBAA, supra note 24, at 178 (citing S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. 
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7)) (stating that “every State remains 
free to adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable”); Caroline 
Wells Stanton, Rights and Remedies: Meaningful Habeas Corpus in Guantanamo, 
23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 891, 899 (2010) (discussing the insufficienty of a purely 
procedural right). 
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Though the Committee Against Torture has scrutinized the 
process, the Executive relies on diplomatic assurances from other 
nations to decide whether to extradite.87 Although a number of 
nations rely on diplomatic assurances, most provide for review rather 
than ending the inquiry at an Executive assurance.88 The United 
States justifies its autonomous use of Executive assurances with the 
rule of non-inquiry, which has not been codified by Congress. Use of 
such assurances has lead the Committee Against Torture to express 
reservations regarding the use of such assurances.89 In fact, the 
Committee adopted guidance relating to UNCAT’s Article 390 and 
decided that diplomatic assurances are inconsistent with UNCAT 
obligations.91 It criticized the opaque nature of the assurances and the 
difficulty in making sure that they were serving their purpose.92
 Diplomatic assurances of conditions in the receiving country rely 
on case-specific circumstances, the country’s human rights record, 
the individual concerned, and concerns regarding torture or 
persecution to determine whether torture is likely in accordance with 
the UNCAT definition.93 In the United States, the Secretary obtains 
 87. Cf. Comm. Against Torture, Rep. on its 36th Sess., May 1–19 2006, 
CAT/C/USA/Co/2 (May 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/images/torture/asset_upload_file807_25607.pdf  [hereinafter 
Recommendations for Committee Against Torture] (contemplating the use of 
diplomatic assurances in the extradition context); NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra 
note 4, at 150 (specifying that the use of diplomatic assurances should only be used 
with transparent procedures for obtaining such assurances including “adequate 
judicial mechanisms for review”). 
 88. ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 66 (noting that Canada requires 
judicial review of executive assurances). 
 89. NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, at 150 (noting that UNCAT has 
expressed concern over the secrecy of the procedure used by the United States). 
 90. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comm. Against 
Torture, CAT General Comment No. 1: Implementation of Article 3 on the 
Convention in the Context of Article 22 (Refoulement and Communications), U.N. 
Doc. A/53/44, annex IX (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Committee Comment] 
(providing how to effectively implement UNCAT’s nonrefoulement policy and 
specifically confining Article 3’s application to “cases where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that the author would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture as defined in article 1 of the Convention”). 
 91. Committee Comment, supra note 90, ¶ 9(b). 
 92. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, at 151–53 (requiring states to 
comply with the material and procedural guarantees set out by UNCAT). 
 93. See Prosper Declaration, supra note 83, ¶ 7; see also Katherine R. 
Hawkins, The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic Assurances and the Legality of 
 
  
228 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:1 
such assurances from a country requesting extradition, and then 
makes his own “assurance” (the Executive assurance) by signing a 
formal statement with his determination.94 Notably, however, 
detainees “have been transferred to countries that our own State 
Department has acknowledged torture prisoners.”95 The preclusion of 
judicial review of assurances in the extradition context seems to be 
unique to the United States.96 Both European and Canadian courts, 
for example, subject diplomatic assurances to review of at least some 
substance.97  
2. The Changing Face of the Boumediene Holding Under UNCAT 
Claims: Munaf and Omar 
Comparatively, United States extradition practice differs from that 
of other countries, and recent case law provides context. Munaf v. 
Geren set the contemporary stage for understanding the intersection 
between international law and constitutional law with regard to 
United States compliance with UNCAT.98 The Supreme Court 
unanimously held in Munaf, a non-extradition case not implicating 
FARRA that many scholars believe was meant to and should be 
“Rendition”, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 213, 232 (2006) (explaining that diplomatic 
assurances alone cannot be sufficient for the UNCAT Article 3 requirement that 
“authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations” in evaluating the 
likelihood of torture). 
 94. Id. ¶ 7 (discussing the duties of the Department of State in the transfer of 
detainees). 
 95. Al-Marri v. Bush, No. Civ. A. 04-2035(GK), 2005 WL 774843, at *4 
(D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2005). See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 984 (dismissing 
Trinidad y Garcia’s habeas plea despite evidence that other men accused in the 
same case were tortured by Philippine officials and a State Department report that 
torture is common among security and police forces there). 
 96. See generally ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 10–11 (noting that the 
United States relies heavily on diplomatic and executive assurances). 
 97. Id. at 66, n.126. 
 98. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008). See generally Lyle Denniston, 
Munaf’s Impact Widens Again, SCOTUSBLOG (June 10, 2012, 8:18 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/munafs-impact-widens-again/ (expressing 
concern with Munaf, explaining that Munaf’s holding, because it has been a “major 
precedent” rather than remaining limited to its specific facts, has played a 
significant role in expanding executive power in subsequent cases as exemplified 
by the recent case law which gives the Secretary of State the final word in 
extradition cases); cf. Omar, 646 F.3d at 22 (interpreting Munaf as warning to 
federal judges not to question government decisions about Guantanamo Bay 
detainees). 
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limited to its facts,99 that the federal judiciary did not have the power 
to block the Iraqi military from turning over U.S. citizens to the Iraqi 
military despite the petitioners’ fear of torture if transferred.100 
Although the Court engaged in striking deference to the Executive, it 
noted in a crucial passage that because neither petitioner invoked 
FARRA in his habeas claim, the Court would not consider whether 
FARRA prohibited their transfer to Iraqi authorities, and thus refused 
to decide more generally whether a meritorious claim existed under 
the statute.101 
The D.C. Circuit in Kiyemba v. Obama read Munaf to mandate 
conclusive Executive deference in transfer decisions.102 Two years 
after Kiyemba, in Omar v. McHugh,103 the D.C. Circuit again relied 
on Munaf, this time to hold that the REAL ID Act of 2005 divested 
the federal judiciary of habeas jurisdiction in transfer cases.104 The 
panel reasoned that while REAL ID created an alternate route for 
review for those in removal proceedings while barring the 
opportunity for habeas review, it did not do the same for transferees, 
and thus Omar could not invoke habeas under FARRA.105 Curiously, 
Munaf did not consider the FARRA question, but the Omar court 
 99. See Munaf, 533 U.S. at 703, n.6 (“We hold that these habeas petitions raise 
no claim for relief under [FARRA] and express no opinion on whether Munaf and 
Omar may be permitted to amend their respective pleadings to raise such a claim 
on remand. Even if considered on the merits, several issues under the [FARRA] 
claim would have to be addressed.”). 
 100. Id. at 693–94. 
 101. Id. (discussing the possibility of a FARRA claim in this context); see also 
id. at 702 (“The judiciary is not suited to second-guess . . . determinations that 
would require federal courts to pass judgment on foreign justice systems and 
undermine the Government’s ability to speak with one voice in this area.”); 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Introductory Note to United States Supreme Court: Munaf v. 
Geren, 47 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 705, 710 (2008) (“[T]he Court’s unnecessary 
analysis of Munaf’s torture claim suggests that future litigants will have an 
enormously high burden to surmount in order to state a viable claim on the 
merits.”). 
 102. 561 F.3d 509, 513–14 (holding in a broad construction of Munaf that 
executive assurances foreclosed petitioners’ claim for relief, disregarding 
petitioners’ argument that Munaf was unique to its facts and did not implicate 
FARRA like the present case; thus, ultimately interpreting Munaf to mean that 
CAT/FARRA claims in which the Secretary promises the detainee will not be 
transferred to torture are foreclosed on their merits). 
 103. 646 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 104. Id. at 16. 
 105. Id. at 17. 
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relied on Munaf and the historical use of the habeas writ to invalidate 
Omar’s argument that the habeas privilege and FARRA combined to 
create a right to judicial review.106 Contemporary scholars argue that 
the Omar court effectively ignored the existence and operation of a 
universal anti-torture treaty in their decision.107 
3. Trinidad y Garcia, UNCAT, and a Right Contained on a Piece of 
Paper 
Munaf was most recently applied in the Ninth Circuit in an 
extradition case, Trinidad y Garcia v. Thomas.108 The panel in that 
case held that while it had jurisdiction to hear Garcia’s habeas claim 
under FARRA, it could not provide relief so long as the Secretary 
put forth, in accordance with the Executive’s standard for 
nonrefoulement, that it was not “more likely than not” that the 
detainee would be tortured upon transfer.109 In so holding, the panel 
essentially limited UNCAT Article 3 to a purely procedural right. 
While the Secretary argued that it was within her sole discretion to 
decide whether “torture is more likely than not,” the lawyers 
representing Garcia argued that extraditing him would constitute a 
violation of his affirmative UNCAT nonrefoulement rights.110 
The Ninth Circuit concluded, en banc, that while Garcia could file 
his habeas claim alleging that his UNCAT rights were violated, his 
only right to review was to have the Secretary consider all evidence 
and subsequently decide whether the anti-torture standard had been 
met, as evidenced by the Secretary’s signature.111 Though the court 
went further than the Omar panel in recognizing the role of 
 106. Id. at 29 (arguing that no right to review was available before FARRA, and 
that FARRA also did not create such right). 
 107. See ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17. 
 108. See generally 683 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 109. Compare id. at 961 (holding that REAL ID does not divest the court of 
habeas jurisdiction, though the claim is foreclosed when the Secretary has 
performed her duty in accordance with FARRA regulations), with Omar, 646 F.3d 
at 15 (holding that REAL ID does divest the court of habeas jurisdiction). 
 110. Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 958; see also Fisher, supra note 12, at 978 
(“Some lower courts’ willingness . . . to examine the factual issues surrounding 
fear of torture claims indicates that FARRA could be a viable method to challenge 
transfer decisions.”). 
 111. Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957 (“An extraditee thus possesses a narrow 
liberty interest: that the Secretary comply with her statutory and regulatory 
obligations.”). 
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customary international law in dictating Garcia’s rights, it defined 
that every UNCAT right as procedural.112 Thus, the court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c), 
which “provides an avenue of relief to persons, such as Trinidad y 
Garcia, who are challenging the legality of extradition proceedings,” 
but the extent of this “avenue” is an Executive assurance.113 Upon 
filing, “the court’s inquiry shall have reached its end.”114 
Recognizing that UNCAT and FARRA at the very least required the 
Secretary to “formally” rule on whether extradition could take place, 
the court remanded Garcia’s case to decide whether the Secretary 
had done her duty.115 Thus, an extradition to the requesting country 
could run the risk of violating international law. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Basic principles of international law alongside the Boumediene-
conferred right to review require a substantive UNCAT right to seek 
review of an extradition or transfer decision. This analysis begins 
with the interpretation tools in the Vienna Convention, which 
collectively demonstrate FARRA’s insufficiency as an UNCAT 
subset. It is given further dimension by a close look at what circuit 
courts have emphasized when hearing individuals seeking to enforce 
a FARRA right. Unless UNCAT was meant to confer a purely 
procedural right, Executive assurances, such as that settled on in 
Trinidad y Garcia, are insufficient to satisfy both the international 
treaty and its domestic counterpart. 
A. A COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
To analyze United States compliance with the nonrefoulement 
mandate in UNCAT, a viable starting point is a juxtaposition of 
UNCAT’s Article 3 text with FARRA’s section 2242 text in 
accordance with the Vienna Convention.116 Such analysis 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 958; see infra Part III.B (arguing that relief under FARRA requires a 
Boumediene-based opportunity for meaningful review in order to effectuate 
compliance with UNCAT). 
 114. Id. at 957. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Compare UNCAT, supra note 4, art. 3(1) (providing for an absolute 
nonrefoulement mandate), with FARRA, supra note 8, § 2242 (implementing 
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demonstrates that there are no textual problems with FARRA;117 
however, despite FARRA’s prima facie consistency with UNCAT, 
extradition jurisprudence suggests a derogation of United States 
nonrefoulement obligations.118 
The UNCAT nonrefoulement clause provides that “[n]o State 
Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another 
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture.”119 The relevant clause of 
FARRA section 2242 provides that “[i]t shall be the policy of the 
United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the 
involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are 
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture.”120 The United States ratified UNCAT 
subject to the understanding that “substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture” means “if it 
is more likely than not that he would be tortured.”121  
Textually, FARRA is consistent with UNCAT. Because it is clear 
that FARRA was implemented as a domestic extension and 
execution of UNCAT and is meant to be interpreted as such, there is 
UNCAT’s Article 3 nonrefoulement mandate in its entirety). 
 117. See Vienna Convention, supra note 61. But see NOWAK & MCARTHUR, 
supra note 4, at 151 (“It is not enough that a country has an extradition law in line 
with Article 3. Practice must also comply with Article 3 obligations.”). See 
generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, “Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,” http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 
2012) (explaining that the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention 
since the Senate has not given its advice and consent to the treaty, but considers 
many provisions of the Convention to constitute customary international law). 
 118. See, e.g., Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957 (conferring a purely 
procedural right under FARRA despite FARRA’s purpose as a domestic 
implementation of UNCAT’s anti-torture initiative). 
 119. UNCAT, supra note 4, art. 3(1). See generally BURGERS & DANELIUS, 
supra note 17, at 56 (remarking that during Working Group proposals for UNCAT 
Article 3 text, the United States suggested that a list of situations creating a 
specific risk of torture would have to include “religious persecution, denial of free 
speech, suppression of political dissent and of the free flow of information, and 
armed intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state”). 
 120. FARRA, supra note 8, § 2242 (emphasis added). 
 121. 136 CONG. REC. 36, 193 (1990); see Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821, 
826, 827 (9th Cir. 2004) (supporting the “more likely than not standard” in that an 
applicant for UNCAT nonrefoulement relief need only show “a chance greater 
than fifty percent that he will be tortured if removed”). 
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little doubt as to its purpose.122 The question then becomes whether, 
with this knowledge, the United States has complied in its 
implementation of FARRA as an UNCAT subset.123 
United States management of fugitives and transferees is so 
fundamentally inconsistent with UNCAT that it is difficult to 
imagine FARRA being a domestic extension of the former despite 
the textual parallel.124 Acknowledging that the relief required under 
UNCAT/FARRA is precisely what the Boumediene Court 
contemplated with its notion of “meaningful review” and further 
demonstrates this inconsistency.125 The goal of UNCAT is to combat 
the international torture problem, an effort that necessarily includes 
providing detainees with an avenue through which to challenge their 
extraditions or transfers when there is a risk of torture, or the goal 
cannot be effectuated and rights cannot be enforced.126 The 
implementation of FARRA has not allowed for such review.127 
Dictum by a number of Circuit Judges, specifically the rationale in 
Omar and Trinidad y Garcia, demonstrates the nonconforming 
implementation, partially by the interpretation of REAL ID and 
FARRA as mechanisms of foreclosure rather than relief, and 
partially by disregarding UNCAT.128  
 122. See Hearings, supra note 23 (discussing the full implementation of 
UNCAT Article 3 into U.S. law via FARRA and the adoption of UNCAT’s 
absolute nonrefoulement obligation). 
 123. See infra Part III.B (analyzing U.S. implementation of FARRA within the 
context of its obligations under UNCAT); cf. NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, 
at 129–30 (explaining that the UNCAT Committee requires that “domestic 
authorities of the host country” implement a torture risk-assessment test that places 
the burden of proof on the detainee to establish a prima facie case of actual 
systematic torture in the home country, or that he or she is personally at risk of 
being subjected to torture if returned). 
 124. Cf. Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (offering no 
rights of judicial review to extradition and military transferees under FARRA, and 
finding that the statute only offered rights to individuals in immigration 
proceedings). 
 125. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779; see discussion, supra Part II.D (discussing 
the requirements of meaningful review). 
 126. UNCAT, supra note 4, pmbl. (desiring “to make more effective the 
struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment throughout the world”). 
 127. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 20 (concluding that Congress is not obligated to 
grant detainees subject to extradition the right to judicial review of the Secretary’s 
determination of the likelihood of torture in the receiving country). 
 128. See, e.g., id. at 23 (rejecting “that the REAL ID Act, to the extent it 
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Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires that the “object 
and purpose” of a treaty be considered when interpreting the 
document.129 The object and purpose of UNCAT was to create an 
internationally uniform mechanism to combat the use of torture.130 
The United States’ Executive has in effect interpreted this to mean 
that Executive assurances are sufficient to ensure a relator’s safety in 
a receiving country.131 In light of the goals of UNCAT, it seems 
strange that an Executive signatory—a single slip of paper not 
subject to review—would be adequate for compliance.132 What is 
more surprising still is the judiciary’s acceptance of this method 
considering the Supreme Court’s holding that “treaties, like statutes, 
are the ‘law of the land.’”133 Presumably, a right contained in a treaty 
is empty unless it is enforced.  
amended [FARRA], violated the Constitution’s guarantee of habeas corpus” and 
thus foreclosing FARRA rights rather than recognizing that the Act is limited to 
the immigration context). See generally War, Terror, and the Federal Courts, 
supra note 66, at 1269–70 (opining that principles of international law should play 
a role in interpreting domestic legislation); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 
U.S. 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate 
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”). 
 129. Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31(1). 
 130. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, at 88 (noting article 2 of UNCAT 
which reads that “each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, 
judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its 
jurisdiction. No exceptional circumstances . . . may be invoked as a justification of 
torture,” reflective of a presupposition of the existence of a human right to personal 
integrity and dignity and is part of making more effective the efforts against 
torture). 
 131. See, e.g., Implementation of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18 (2013) (declaring that once the Attorney General, together with the 
Secretary of State, determines that the diplomatic assurances against the use of 
torture are reliable enough to meet the Article 3 obligation, the detainee’s 
challenge to extradition is concluded). 
 132. See ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 23–26, 42 (speculating that 
executive assurances are insufficient for UNCAT compliance); cf. Khouzam, 549 
F.3d at 242–44, 252–53) (noting that the case contemplates the opportunity for 
review in light of the fact that the negotiating history of UNCAT and the 
legislative history of FARRA are silent on the use of assurances, and citing to 
other countries that allow judicial review of the reliability of diplomatic 
assurances). 
 133. Jane C. Kim, Note, Nonrefoulement Under the Convention Against 
Torture: How U.S. Allowances for Diplomatic Assurances Contravene Treaty 
Obligations and Federal Law, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1227, 1228, 1232 (2007) 
(quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829)). 
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Article 21(3)(c) requires consideration of “relevant rules of 
international law”134 in treaty interpretation. There are no exceptions 
to UNCAT’s nonrefoulement obligation, which is widely accepted as 
a jus cogens norm of customary international law.135 Further, as a 
means of implementation, it is doubtful that Executive assurances are 
an effective way to guarantee the operability of FARRA’s 
“substantial grounds to believe” standard.136 As a result, with such 
assurances comprising the only mechanism for “relief,” the United 
States is derogating from its UNCAT obligations. The undisputable 
initiative of UNCAT makes clear that FARRA, in its implementation 
as an anti-torture framework, is implicitly in disaccord with UNCAT. 
An international treaty is only as effective as individual nation 
implementation allows. 
B. EXTRADITION, EXECUTIVE ASSURANCES, AND DEFERENCE: A 
DEROGATION OF UNCAT TREATY OBLIGATIONS 
Recent extradition jurisprudence, specifically within the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, exemplifies United 
States noncompliance with UNCAT.137 The way in which transfer 
and extradition cases have been decided, beginning with Munaf138 
 134. Vienna Convention, supra note 61, art. 31(3)(c). 
 135. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, at 147 (recognizing that the 
nonrefoulement obligations in Article 3 of UNCAT are absolute). 
 136. See Special Rapporteur of the Comm’n on Human Rights, Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, transmitted by 
Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. A/60/316 (Aug. 30, 2005) (expressing 
the view that diplomatic assurances are ineffective because “such assurances are 
sought usually from States where the practice of torture is systematic[,] post-return 
monitoring mechanisms have proven to be no guarantee against torture[, and] 
diplomatic assurances are not legally binding . . . ”). 
 137. See, e.g., Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(distinguishing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008)) (“Given that the present 
cases involve habeas petitions that implicate sensitive foreign policy issues in the 
context of ongoing military operations, reaching the merits is the wisest course.”); 
Kiyemba, 561 F.3d at 514–15 (holding that relief under a writ of habeas corpus and 
removal under FARRA are separate and distinct, and one does not ensure the 
other); Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 956–57 (remanding the detainee’s case in 
light of an explicit recognition that, under FARRA, that Department of State is the 
appropriate agency to prescribe regulations to implement the Article 3 UNCAT 
obligations, and that the Executive branch should be afforded deference when 
making determinations). 
 138. 553 U.S. at 692, 700 (holding that it is the duty of the Executive, not the 
Judiciary, to make decisions on foreign policy and the conduct of foreign states, 
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and ending most recently with the ambiguous decision in Trinidad y 
Garcia,139 suggests a derogation of United States nonrefoulement 
obligations.140 As the law stands, noncitizens who can prove that 
torture is “more likely than not” are entitled to UNCAT protection as 
a right; but the judicial deference given to the Executive in both the 
assurance that due diligence has been done (by way of diplomatic 
assurances), and in a misreading of Munaf, restricts this affirmative 
right to one country’s word that it will do the right thing.141 
Boumediene tells us that in addition to this protection, detainees have 
a conclusive right to meaningful review.142 Under Trinidad y Garcia, 
this means the Secretary signing a piece of paper, and begs the 
question of whether a signature is an appropriate form of meaningful 
review.143 If a signature is not meaningful review, then Boumediene 
is effectively undermined by the way federal Courts of Appeals have 
handled detainees facing extradition.144 An under-inclusive 
interpretation of a FARRA-enforced right morphs that right into one 
that is solely procedural.145 
The unambiguous purpose of the nonrefoulement clause of 
and, in recognition of that principle, rejecting the detainees’ habeas claim on its 
merits). 
 139. 683 F.3d at 957 (remanding the case to allow the Secretary of State to show 
that she exercised due diligence when assessing the detainee’s risk of being 
tortured upon extradition). 
 140. See generally Int’l Comm’n of Jurists & Swiss Comm. Against Torture, 
Torture: How to Make the International Convention Effective (2d ed. 1980) (draft 
optional protocol); National Commission of Jurists & Swiss Committee Against 
Torture, Torture: How to Make the International Convention Effective, 1980 (draft 
optional protocol) (suggesting ways in which nations can successfully implement 
UNCAT). 
 141. See generally ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 7 (discussing the U.S. 
interpretation of the principle of nonrefoulement under Article 3 of the UNCAT); 
Kim, supra note 133, at 1230–32. 
 142. 533 U.S. at 783. 
 143. See infra Part III.C (elaborating on the use of Executive assurances in 
extradition assessments). 
 144. See Vladeck, D.C. Circuit Court Vitiates the Suspension Clause, supra note 
54 (observing that the court’s decision in Omar, that detainees subject to 
extradition may not benefit from the protections of habeas corpus, undermines the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Boumediene). 
 145. See Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 998 (Berzon, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (arguing that limiting judicial review to a procedural 
examination of the Secretary of State’s assessment undermines substantive 
UNCAT rights). 
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UNCAT is to ensure that detainees are not subjected to torture while 
undergoing the process of criminal sanctioning.146 But the process of 
obtaining diplomatic assurances and manifesting their reliability in a 
signature is certainly an informal one, so regulations precluding 
judicial review of a FARRA claim (in essence an UNCAT claim) are 
fundamentally contrary to the statute itself.147 The Executive’s 
signature is based solely on diplomatic assurances, which are, in 
effect, verbal exchanges between nations regarding the likelihood of 
torture.148 Because judicial review of the Secretary’s subsequent 
decision is barred,149 the Secretary’s obligation to comply with 
UNCAT as implemented by FARRA is overlooked in favor of severe 
Executive deference.150 This oversight occurs even in light of 
FARRA’s requirement that “all evidence relevant to the possibility 
of future torture . . . be considered.”151 Allowing this oversight is an 
 146. See, e.g., ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 5; Hawkins, supra note 93, at 
221 (explaining that under the federal regulations to FARRA, the United States 
ratified the UNCAT under the understanding that the Convention’s “substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture” is 
interpreted as “if it is more likely than not that he would be tortured”). But see Arar 
v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (recognizing the Bush administration’s 
argument that Arar’s deportation was legal because it obtained promises from 
Syria, Arar’s citizen country, that he would not be tortured). 
 147. See Dana Priest, CIA’s Assurances on Transferred Suspects Doubted, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/articles/A42072-2005Mar16.html (elucidating that the procedure for 
obtaining assurances is brief and informal, and involves no written assurance but 
instead a verbal exchange from foreign intelligence service which is cabled back to 
CIA headquarters). 
 148. Cf. id. 
 149. Barring judicial review in these extradition cases began with the rule of 
non-inquiry. Generally speaking, the Judiciary has taken the stance that the 
Executive is charged with weighing humanitarian grounds against extradition. 
ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 12. But see ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, 
at 20 (observing that some courts have suggested, but have not invoked, an 
exception to this rule in “situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be 
subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a . . . court’s sense of 
decency as to require reexamination of” the general principle against judicial 
review (quoting Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 
U.S. 851 (1960))). See generally Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 584 (6th 
Cir. 1985) (“[C]ourt[s] [are not]empowered to order the extradition of any person. 
Extradition is an act of the Executive Branch.”). 
 150. See Hawkins, supra note 93, at 228–29 (highlighting that the procedure for 
the assessment of diplomatic assurances is informal and vague). 
 151. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16. (c)(3) (2013); see, e.g., Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 
1126, 1133 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that evidence of torture in a nation’s human 
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explicit derogation of treaty obligations; the basic goals of UNCAT 
and the nonrefoulement clause in particular make clear that 
mechanisms as intangible and unreliable as diplomatic assurances 
and as unreviewable as Executive assurances are inappropriate for 
nonrefoulement compliance.152 
While poignant and compelling arguments support Executive 
deference on wartime matters,153 the UNCAT-based right to be free 
from torture “is an international standard of the highest order” which 
does not gel with a wholly unreviewable Executive.154 The D.C. 
Circuit’s rationale in Omar, in particular, fractures the Court’s Munaf 
rights record does not prove that a petitioner personally is more likely than not to 
be tortured if deported, and explaining that a report of torture “unrelated to the 
applicant does not provide a basis for withholding removal without evidence that 
the applicant himself will be targeted”); Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1126 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that evidence of torture in a nation’s human rights record does 
not prove that a petitioner personally is more likely than not to be tortured if 
deported, and explaining that a report of torture “unrelated to the applicant does 
not provide a basis for withholding removal without evidence that the applicant 
himself will be targeted”). Contra Hawkins, supra note 93, at 229 (noting that the 
second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth circuits have all overturned 
UNCAT decisions by immigration judges for “failing to consider relevant evidence 
about the risk of torture”). 
 152. See Hawkins, supra note 93, at 217 (opining that executive assurances are 
“legally worthless” in light of the two main restrictions that UNCAT implementing 
legislation and regulations in the U.S. place on transfers: prisoners may not be 
rendered to countries where the odds of torture are greater than fifty percent, and 
the Executive must consider “all relevant evidence” in making this determination); 
id. at 261 (citing Ian Bruce, Middleman Reveals Al Qaeda Secrets; Interrogation 
Methods Would be Illegal in U.S., THE HERALD SCOTLAND (Oct. 17, 2002), 
http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/middleman-reveals-al-qaeda-
secrets-interrogation-methods-would-be-illegal-in-us-1.136338) (quoting the 
former head of the CIA’s counterterrorism division, Vincent Cannistraro’s 
skepticism of Syria’s assurances that it would not torture prisoners extradited to its 
territory). See generally Hearings, supra note 23 (making clear that the United 
States is adopting its nonrefoulement obligations under UNCAT for the purpose of 
combating torture); Vincent Cannistraro, former head of CIA counterterrorism 
division commenting for pub., Ian Bruce, Middleman Reveals Al Qaeda Secrets, 
THE HERALD, (Glasgow), Oct. 17, 2002, at 6 (stating explicitly that certain forms 
of torture are “crude, but highly effective, although we could never condone it 
publicly,” and that it is naïve to think, for example, “the Syrians were not going to 
use torture, even if they were making claims to the contrary.”). 
 153. E.g., Fisher, supra note 12, at 979–81 (citing, among others, national 
security concerns, the importance of maintaining a uniform Executive voice, and 
the impairment of “Executive energy and decision making in foreign policy” as 
rationales for Executive deference in extradition decisions). 
 154. Cornejo-Barreto, 379 F.3d at 1016. 
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holding to stand for a warning to the judiciary to not involve itself in 
Executive affairs.155 Nowhere in that court’s opinion is there any 
recognition of critical treaty obligations under UNCAT.156 Some 
Supreme Court critics argue for notions of judicial cosmopolitanism; 
the idea that decisions should rely at least in part, where relevant, on 
foreign and international law.157 Few if any other western nations 
sacrifice substantive review in favor of a non-reviewable Executive 
assurance.158 Perhaps acceptance of this on the circuit court level 
would, as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor claims, “enrich our own 
country’s decisions.”159 The United States will remain in derogation 
of its nonrefoulement obligations lest it reach a viable method of 
reconciling international policy with constitutional doctrine. 
C. DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS: UNCAT NONCOMPLIANCE AS 
DEMONSTRATED BY THE D.C. AND NINTH CIRCUITS WITH 
DISREGARD FOR FARRA IN RECENT EXTRADITION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Ninth and D.C. Circuits in Omar and Trinidad y Garcia 
demonstrated the inconsistency that is theoretically illustrated by the 
Vienna Convention analysis. Basic logic indicates that both circuits 
cannot be right in their respective extradition cases.160 As mentioned 
above, while the Munaf Court dismissed petitioner’s transfer 
injunction in a severe bout of Executive deference, it was not 
 155. Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he inquiry that 
Omar asks this Court to undertake in this habeas case . . . is the precise inquiry that 
the Supreme Court in Munaf already rejected.”). 
 156. Id. at 20–25 (disregarding and blatantly failing to consider the United 
States’ obligations under UNCAT, and ignoring that treaty as a major player in 
deciding whether Omar should have the opportunity for judicial review of his case 
on the merits, the Secretary’s Executive assurance notwithstanding). 
 157. Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial 
Cosmopolitanism, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 39 (2007). 
 158. See ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17. 
 159. Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks at the 
Southern Center for International Studies, 2 (Oct. 28, 2003) available at 
http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_transcript.pdf; see also War, Terror, and 
the Federal Courts, supra note 66, at 1269–70 (opining that international law can 
be beneficially instructive when interpreting domestic legislation). 
 160. Compare Omar, 646 F.3d at 25 (divesting the court of jurisdiction to 
review), with Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957 (holding that the court did have 
jurisdiction to review, but that review was limited to the Secretary’s assurance that 
she completed due diligence under the torture standard). 
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occasioned to rule on whether, in another case, a successful claim 
could be brought under FARRA.161 This means, by extension, that 
the Munaf court did not comment on what type of review FARRA 
requires. Even so, subsequent en banc decisions expanded a holding 
that was at its own admittance limited to its facts, and used it to 
preclude relief.162 This is a curious conclusion considering that 
FARRA was ratified to create domestic obligations of otherwise non-
self-executing UNCAT provisions.163 If FARRA is not meant to 
provide protection from torture, then what is its role? 
Kiyemba interpreted the Court’s holding in Munaf to mean that the 
government’s blanket assurance that it does not transfer to torture 
conclusively foreclosed claims for relief;164 however, unlike Munaf 
and very significantly, the petitioners in Kiyemba invoked 
FARRA.165 Kiyemba could not naturally embrace the Munaf logic 
because FARRA was not implicated in Munaf; thus, a new layer was 
added. But as if judicial review was anathema, the D.C. Circuit still 
held that FARRA review would undermine “norms of international 
comity.”166 The Kiyemba court thus broadened Munaf’s holding 
without any indication that FARRA might be an operable extension 
of UNCAT, and set a dangerous precedent for future extradition and 
transfer jurisprudence raised under UNCAT.167  
The D.C. Circuit’s cavalier disregard for treaty obligations and the 
 161. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 702 (“The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such 
determinations—determinations that would require federal courts to pass judgment 
on foreign justice systems and undermine the Government’s ability to speak with 
one voice in this area.”); id. at 691 (rejecting detainees’ habeas claims based on the 
merits of their particular case rather than because of a lack of jurisdiction). 
 162. Id. at 702 (noting also that “this is not a more extreme case in which the 
Executive has determined that a detainee is likely to be tortured but decides to 
transfer him anyway”); see Vladeck, Why the “Munaf Sequels” Matter, supra note 
46 (“Munaf required deference to the Executive Branch, but did not address 
whether such deference could ever be overcome, whether in a case where the 
detainee’s claim arose under FARRA or otherwise.”). 
 163. Omar, 646 F.3d at 17 (“[UNCAT] is non-self-executing and thus does not 
itself create any rights enforceable in U.S. courts.”). 
 164. Vladeck, Why the “Munaf Sequels” Matter, supra note 46. 
 165. Kiyemba, 561 F.3d at 514–15. 
 166. Id. at 515. 
 167. Cf. Kim, supra note 133, at 1235–36, 1229–30 n.31 (noting that FARRA is 
a conclusive adoption of UNCAT and thus arguing that rights should be afforded 
under that statute). 
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purpose of FARRA took a severe turn in Omar.168 In holding that 
REAL ID169 divested it of habeas jurisdiction, the court left no 
avenue for relief for detainees bringing FARRA claims, and 
conclusively stated that FARRA does not give “transferees . . . a 
right to judicial review of their likely treatment in the receiving 
country.”170 And so, they forgot about FARRA; FARRA actually 
provides a basis for relief as an UNCAT subset, so it is counter to the 
sole purpose of FARRA to claim that a transferee possesses no right 
to judicial review in the receiving country.171 Because this judicial 
review is functionally identical to judicial review of indefinite 
Executive detainment, this right really has existed since 
Boumediene.172 The Omar panel also determined that its conclusion 
did not violate the Suspension Clause because “longstanding 
extradition principles” have never allowed habeas “to be a valid 
means of inquiry into the treatment [of] the relator,”173 putting itself 
in disaccord not only with UNCAT, but with fundamental 
constitutional law in a contrived attempt to delineate between 
constitutional law and international law where such delineation is 
 168. Omar, 646 F.3d 13. 
 169. REAL ID Act, supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 170. Omar, 646 F.3d at 15–16 (relying on “longstanding extradition principles” 
to withhold habeas review and allow REAL ID to divest the court of its remedial 
jurisdiction, and in doing so, relying solely on history, notions of the separation of 
powers, and constitutional superiority). But see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
575–78 (2005) (deeming international authorities as “instructive” when making 
constitutional decisions). 
 171. See Vladeck, D.C. Circuit Court Vitiates the Suspension Clause, supra note 
54 (expressing the conflated rationale of the Omar panel and criticizing its 
disregard for the precedent set out under Boumediene in favor of a federal right to 
judicial review). 
 172. See Huq, supra note 77, at 397–98 (noting that the right to review existed 
before Boumediene, although that case gave color to such right); Brief of Legal 
Historians and Habeas Corpus Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 
Kiyemba, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. at 2–4 (March 1, 
2010) (per curiam) [hereinafter Brief of Legal Historians] (positing that the right to 
review in transfer claims actually existed at common law long before 
Boumediene); see also Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 998 (Berzon, J., concurring) 
(arguing that since the Secretary of State’s assessment of torture practices is 
similar to the proceeding in Boumediene addressing executive detainment, 
extradition claims can also be subject to habeas review). 
 173. Omar, 646 F.3d at 16. But see Brief of Legal Historians, supra note 172, at 
16 (asserting arguendo that even if there was no right to judicial review pre-
FARRA because there was no basis for relief, historically, the habeas writs were 
historically available to challenge potentially unlawful transfers). 
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implausible. The panel, in its focus on REAL ID, failed to reconcile 
the fact that before UNCAT was implemented in the United States, 
there was no basis for relief. 
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Trinidad y Garcia is in 
logical disaccord with Omar.174 The court correctly held that REAL 
ID, in light of the fact that it is strictly an immigration statute, does 
not divest the court of habeas jurisdiction, but so long as the 
Secretary complies with her obligations under domestic law, any 
claim for relief is foreclosed anyway.175 In so holding, it contradicted 
the D.C. Circuit’s Omar decision that the REAL ID was a stand-in 
remedy for habeas under FARRA.176 Though Kiyemba was part of a 
long lineage of Guantanamo cases, Trinidad y Garcia applied the 
deferential rationale found in Kiyemba to an ordinary extradition 
case, making the holding generally applicable extradition law in that 
circuit.177  
D. FARRA, REAL ID, AND EXTRADITION CASE LAW 
(IN)CONSISTENCIES 
Allowing extradition cases to be foreclosed on their merits at the 
signature of the Secretary is insufficient under both UNCAT and 
FARRA. This deference (though unfounded) is substantively 
grounded in a misinterpretation of recent legislation and a dismissal 
of affirmative UNCAT obligations.178 This is at once demonstrated 
 174. Omar, 646 F.3d 13; Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d 952. 
 175. Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957. 
 176. Id. at 958 (“[REAL ID’s] consolidation of judicial review of immigration 
matters has no effect on federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction over claims made in the 
extradition context.”). 
 177. See discussion infra Part III.D (elaborating on the effects of the Trinidad y 
Garcia holding in light of UNCAT obligations). Compare Kiyemba, 561 F.3d at 
514 (purporting to be a fact-specific holding, limited to the fact that the petitioner 
was a Guantanamo detainee and placing the case within the lineage of standard 
Guantanamo litigation), with Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 956–57 (applying the 
holding in executive detention cases, making it generally applicable law, and 
divesting the federal courts of substantive habeas jurisdiction in all cases of habeas 
petitions brought before a court in the UNCAT/FARRA context and implicitly 
holding that there can never be a meritorious claim for review under FARRA). 
 178. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 18 (“Even if [FARRA] had extended a judicial 
review right to extradition or military transferees such as Omar . . . [REAL ID] 
made clear that those kinds of transferees have no such right.”); Trinidad y Garcia, 
683 F.3d at 983 (Tallman J., dissenting) (stating that FARRA “contains nothing in 
the way of even mandatory language—other than its directive to create regulations 
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by the historical availability of the writ of habeas corpus in similar 
contexts, and confused by the fact that a well-established right is 
being foreclosed in the very instance it was meant to apply and 
protect those where there is a threat of torture.179  
The D.C. Circuit’s Omar opinion reflects the fractured reasoning 
and misinterpretation that resulted in the elimination of all avenues 
of review for detainees facing extradition.180 Whether forgetting or 
dismissing that FARRA is, in essence, a leg of UNCAT, the panel 
created a legally fictitious divide between the right to judicial review 
pre- and post- FARRA.181 In justifying its decision that REAL ID 
pretermitted review without an alternative avenue for recourse, the 
Omar panel mistook a lack of a meritorious habeas claim for no right 
to habeas at all.182 
But REAL ID is an immigration statute, as recognized by the 
Ninth Circuit in Trinidad y Garcia.183 Considering the nature of the 
statute as evidenced by its legislative history, it is unclear how it has 
the effect of foreclosing review in the extradition context.184 For a 
fugitive, under Garcia, there is a procedural right, and herein lies the 
majority’s wrong turn. According to Omar, then, not only were there 
never really rights under Boumediene, as it can largely be viewed as 
its own source of equitable jurisdiction, but there are also no 
to implement the United States’ obligations under the Convention”). 
 179. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 553 U.S. 289, 305 (2001) (“The writ of habeas 
corpus has always been available to review the legality of Executive detention.”); 
see also War, Terror, and the Federal Courts, supra note 66, at 1275 (“To argue 
that, in the face of tremendously challenging legal issues, courts should be silent is 
to suggest a form of abdication that we should firmly reject.”). 
 180. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 18–19; see also Vladeck, D.C. Circuit Court 
Vitiates the Suspension Clause, supra note 54. 
 181. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 19–20 (relying on a misinterpretation of the 
historical right to review); cf. Vladeck, D.C. Circuit Court Vitiates the Suspension 
Clause, supra note 54 (supporting the notion that the right to review always 
existed, but that it was not until FARRA was enacted as an extension of UNCAT 
that there was a basis for invoking that review, thus further supporting an argument 
that FARRA has been applied counter to its purpose as implementing UNCAT). 
 182. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 18; Vladeck, D.C. Circuit Court Vitiates the 
Suspension Clause, supra note 54 (explaining that the Omar court mistakenly 
assumed that before FARRA judicial review never existed, thus conflating a lack 
of meritorious habeas review with no right at all). 
 183. 683 F.3d at 958. 
 184. Id. 
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substantive UNCAT rights outside of the removal context.185 
Problematically, this perspective directly contravenes the United 
Nations Committee Reports, which detail the absolute nature of 
nonrefoulement generally, not the absolute nature of nonrefoulement 
as contained within the immigration context.186 Omar did something 
different than Trinidad y Garcia: it essentially used REAL ID to 
preclude all merit-based claims under FARRA, thus invalidating 
those substantive rights contained in UNCAT and universally 
accepted under international law.187 
The court in Trinidad y Garcia embraced a legal fiction that 
meritorious claims were permissible under FARRA, despite its 
correct recognition that REAL ID should have no impact in the 
extradition context.188 In allowing a “meritorious” claim for relief 
under FARRA that is subsequently foreclosed on its merits, the court 
essentially applied Boumediene as a mechanism for invoking 
substantive UNCAT rights, then defined the Boumediene 
“meaningful review” standard in the extradition context to mean the 
Secretary’s signature.189 But meaningful review under FARRA as 
enforced via habeas corpus, assuming arguendo that Congress did 
not mean FARRA to be a place holder in the United States Code, 
requires more, or the UNCAT right to be free from torture is 
 185. See Omar, 646 F.3d at 17 (interpreting FARRA to grant the right to judicial 
review only to immigrants claiming review of a final order of removal). But see 
Fisher, supra note 12, at 962 (offering support for the use of judicial review to 
protect detainee rights because diplomatic assurances, which serve as the basis for 
executive assurances, are suspect). 
 186. E.g., Committee Comment, supra note 90 (expressing concern with the sole 
use of diplomatic assurances as compliance with nonrefoulement obligations 
because they are generally insufficient to protect the right to be free from torture). 
 187. See Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 956 (finding that REAL ID provided an 
alternative remedy in the removal context, without repealing federal habeas 
review). 
 188. Id. at 957, 988 (Circuit Judge Berzon, concurring) (explaining why Judge 
Tallman’s “understanding of [FARRA] could not be more wrong,” and citing 
UNCAT directly to establish that FARRA enacts “as U.S. domestic policy the 
international obligation the United States took in ratifying [UN]CAT”). 
 189. See generally Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (leaving ambiguous the scope 
of habeas protection); Munaf, 533 U.S. at 674 (leaving open the question of 
whether FARRA may be invoked for relief); Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 997–
98 (Berzon, J., concurring) (maintaining that the court in Boumediene recognized 
that habeas is an adaptable remedy, and that, as such, some inquiry is necessary for 
an extradition to be consistent with UNCAT given that executive assurances are 
“not necessarily sufficient” for UNCAT). 
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effectively null.190  
E. UNCAT, AN ANTI-TORTURE MECHANISM, CONTEMPLATED 
“MEANINGFUL REVIEW” UNDER FARRA 
1. Boumediene protection in the extradition context 
Under Boumediene, individuals facing extradition possess rights, 
but “rights are only as meaningful as the remedies available to 
enforce them.”191 For the purposes of review as a recourse under 
UNCAT, the Boumediene petitioners are functionally identical to the 
Trinidad y Garcia petitioners.192 The gap between the two groups is a 
fiction caused by recent circuit court dicta, which incorrectly 
interprets domestic legislation, effectively bifurcating a 
comprehensive mechanism of recourse.193 This stems, at least in part, 
from a stagnated view of the recourse offered by writ as expanded in 
the Guantanamo cases and as necessary for UNCAT compliance.194 
Under Boumediene, those facing extradition are protected from non-
reviewable detainment because those detainees are seeking review of 
an Executive decision that directly affects their status.195 Both the 
 190. See Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 988 (Berzon, J., concurring) 
(responding to Judge Tallman’s dissent in reasoning that FARRA’s “mandate to 
agencies that they ‘implement’ the United States’ obligations under [UN]CAT is a 
direction to put into practice the mandatory Article 3 obligations undertaken by 
signing [UN]CAT and incorporated into U.S. law by the [FARRA]. That mandate 
would be absurd if . . . no such obligations exist under U.S. law at all”). 
 191. Stanton, supra note 86, at 904; see also id. at 899–900 (explaining that the 
power to conduct habeas review inherently provides courts the power to grant a 
remedy). 
 192. In Kiyemba, the court differentiated between “simple” judicial release 
under habeas and political release under FARRA, creating an unnecessary 
distinction, where what matters is the original right to review. 
 193. E.g., Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (REAL ID); 
Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957 (executive assurances). 
 194. Cf. War, Terror, and the Federal Courts, supra note 66, at 1263 (positing 
that “it’s a happy coincidence of our history” that while the courts have not had to 
be particularly involved in answering questions about the separation of and limits 
on the government’s war powers, that may change circumstantially); Hamdi, 542 
U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion) (elucidating similar thoughts to Kennedy’s in 
Boumediene, that the judiciary will sit to review the Executive in a deferential 
light, but to the extent the Executive starts deviating from acceptable practices 
under international law, “that understanding may unravel”). 
 195. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766–67 (concluding that the “citizenship and 
status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that status 
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Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit adhere to flawed rationales.196 In 
deciding their respective extradition cases, the circuits have 
misinterpreted legislation and compartmentalized meaningful review, 
contributing to United States’ derogation of its UNCAT 
obligations.197  
The initial drafts of UNCAT suggest that some system of review is 
due for fugitives under FARRA, and that a signature, no matter how 
formal, will not suffice.198 Instead, under extradition doctrine, 
FARRA has become words with no substance, a statutory 
oxymoron.199 The detainees constitutionally entitled to the habeas 
privilege are functionally analogous to the petitioners attempting to 
enforce affirmative rights under UNCAT/FARRA.200 Any other 
reading not only severely undermines the Boumediene logic, but 
implicitly stands for the notion that indefinite detainment is 
somehow worse than torture such that petitioners in the immediate 
line of Boumediene cases, because they risked indefinite detainment 
rather than torture, had more of a need for judicial interference.201 
determination was made” is one of three circumstances under which the scope of 
the Suspension Clause is determined, and finding that the detainees, because they 
have contested their enemy combatant status, are entitled to habeas review of their 
detention). 
 196. Omar, 646 F.3d at 18; Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957. 
 197. Cf. NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, at 212–13 (noting the then-
Special Rapporteur on Torture, Theo van Boven’s appeal to UNCAT state parties 
to implement a system to monitor the treatment of those extradited). 
 198. See Swedish Draft Convention, supra note 21, art. 3; First Revised Text of 
the Swedish Draft Convention, E/CN.4/WG.1/WP.1 (1979). 
 199. See Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 987–88 (Berzon, J., concurring) 
(opining that Congress would not have “passed a statute with no intent to affect 
anyone’s rights or obligations,” and that if the Secretary of State’s risk-assessment 
of torture is precatory, “then all of [FARRA] would be so,” and the Secretary has a 
binding obligation to not extradite individuals likely to be subjected to torture in 
the receiving state). 
 200. See Vladeck, D.C. Circuit Court Vitiates the Suspension Clause, supra note 
54 (explaining that federal habeas review is not limited to indefinite detention 
cases, as the court in Omar claims, but rather grants the right to judicial review to 
those facing transfer or extradition because it would be counterintuitive to claim 
that those facing extradition were without rights). 
 201. See, e.g., Munaf, 533 U.S. at 693–94; Omar, 646 F.3d at 24 (undermining 
the Boumediene rule by holding that Congress divested federal courts of their 
jurisdiction to hear a substantive claim for relief and finding that habeas review is 
inappropriate in the extradition context because those subject to extradition would 
not benefit from the relief granted in habeas claims, whereas those indefinitely 
detained would). 
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Courts continue to rely on the rationale used in the Guantanamo 
cases,202 but have separated the detainees from the fugitives in 
practice such that one group has no rights, without regard for what is 
required under UNCAT.203 A second look at Justice Kennedy’s 
language in his Boumediene majority opinion makes clear that 
meaningful habeas review is required in contexts, such as 
extradition, where the Executive has sole authority.204 His language 
also bolsters the argument that review is required under UNCAT. 
2. A “Meaningful” Signature?: An Analysis of Executive Assurances 
Under UNCAT 
Without FARRA, detainees have no avenue to invoke habeas 
defensively and thus no mechanism for review or recourse in an 
impending extradition; with FARRA, under a Trinidad y Garcia 
model, review is immediately foreclosed with a signature.205 
The Boumediene right to meaningful review and the UNCAT right 
to be free from torture in essence combine to present a difficult 
 202. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Normalizing Guantánamo, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1547, 1558 (2011) [hereinafter Vladeck, Normalizing Guantánamo] (opining that 
Boumediene’s finding that detainees are entitled to non-statutory habeas review 
under the Suspension Clause considerations in Boumediene has brought on a wave 
of litigation, including in extradition cases, that has attempted to determine the 
scope of that right in light of the finding that Congress violated the suspension 
clause because it “took away access to a habeas remedy that had previously been 
available”). 
 203. See Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 980 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
in original) (attempting to distinguish those facing indefinite detainment and those 
facing extradition by asserting that the “consequence of error” for the former “may 
be detention of persons for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or 
more,” whereas for the latter it “is in fact release from executive detention”). 
Compare Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (benefiting from the privilege of habeas 
review), with Omar, 646 F.3d at 18 (denying meaningful review under the finding 
that REAL ID foreclosed such relief), and Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957 
(holding that meaningful review is equivalent to the Secretary’s assurance that 
torture upon transfer is not “more likely than not”). 
 204. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783 (“Where a person is detained by executive 
order . . . the need for collateral review is most pressing.”); see also Trinidad y 
Garcia, 683 F.3d at 987 (Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“While the magistrate's determination of a detainee's extraditability seems to be a 
proceeding of the kind Boumediene held warrants minimal review, the torture 
determination is much more like the closed proceedings, which Boumediene held 
should be subject to somewhat more searching review.”). 
 205. Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957. 
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challenge to Executive assurances as a vehicle for meaningful 
review. Because this standard leaves detainees with no avenue for 
recourse, both the Suspension Clause and UNCAT suggest that 
Omar and Kiyemba are wrong.206 The rationale in these cases begs 
the question of Trinidad y Garcia207 and what meaningful review 
really is. As the law stands, a detainee could never bring a 
meritorious case under the Secretary’s declaration that he will not be 
tortured upon transfer.208 As if the jurisprudence does not make clear 
that these detainees are being overlooked for reasons of Executive 
deference, looking to other nations provides a substantial basis for 
the conclusion that the right to be free from torture requires more 
than a signature.209 Under Trinidad y Garcia, detainees facing 
extradition or transfer have a supposed right without any remedy.210 
 206. Cf. id. at 984–86 (Berzon , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(disagreeing with the majority on the basis that not only is the majority’s result a 
violation of the mandatory nonrefoulement mandate under UNCAT, it overlooked 
the petitioner’s substantive claim that FARRA’s prohibition of extradition in the 
face of torture makes the Secretary’s determination on his extradition is illegal if, 
on the information available to her, it is more likely than not that petitioner will be 
tortured, and finding that the court has the right to review the Secretary’s 
determination to ensure that she abides by her obligation to assess the risk of 
torture with due diligence); see also Vladeck, Normalizing Guantánamo, supra 
note 202, at 1554 (introducing the notion that FARRA may be seen to confer 
entitlement to a “substantive statutory right against transfer to torture” when raised 
in light of habeas corpus proceedings). 
 207. 683 F.3d at 957 (“An extraditee thus possesses a narrow liberty interest: 
that the Secretary comply with her statutory and regulatory obligations.”). 
 208. Cf. ASIL DISCUSSION, supra note 17, at 25 n.126 (citing Khouzam, 549 
F.3d at 564) (citing a Human Rights Watch affidavit stating that Austria, Canada, 
Germany, Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United 
Kingdom all provide judicial review of the reliability and sufficiency of diplomatic 
assurances, and thus observing that the United States may be alone in its practice 
of not providing for judicial review). 
 209. See NOWAK & MCARTHUR, supra note 4, at 150 (explaining, by example, 
that the fact that Venezuela disallowed Executive review of Supreme Court 
extradition decisions without possibility for appeal was contrary to Article 3, and 
more generally asserting the UNCAT Committee’s recommendation that states 
parties implement “adequate judicial mechanisms for review” in order to mitigate 
concerns over the reliability of diplomatic). 
 210. Cf. Stanton, supra note 86, at 896–97 (explaining that U.S. courts recognize 
the right for Guantánamo detainees to bring habeas claims, but do not possess the 
power to enforce their immediate release, thereby granting detainees a right 
without a meaningful remedy). 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: HOW TO RECONCILE 
THE TENSION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
A. UNNECESSARY AMBIGUITIES 
Post-Munaf cases have been plagued with a number of 
ambiguities, making it that much harder to understand how or why 
courts are making such extradition and transfer decisions. Despite 
what Judge Randolph of the D.C. Circuit maintained in his opinion 
in Kiyemba, removal is removal.211 A contrived distinction between 
FARRA relief and habeas relief not only undermines the 
advancement that United States federal courts have made with regard 
to fair treatment of wartime prisoners, it disallows otherwise 
available review for claims brought under UNCAT/FARRA.212 
Because it defies logic to claim that extradition to another country 
versus relief from indefinite United States detainment should be 
distinct in their treatment and application, this differentiation should 
be abrogated moving forward to ensure that all detainees are able to 
exercise the rights objectively due to them. 
The general need to accept and embrace the overlap between 
constitutional and international law with respect to extradition 
jurisprudence is demonstrated by the inoperativeness of a distinction 
between relief under the writ of habeas corpus and relief under 
FARRA.213 The larger piece of this recognition is an understanding 
 211. Kiyemba, 555 F.3d at 519 (explaining that there is a substantive difference 
between seeking simple release under habeas proceedings and release into the 
United States because the habeas jurisdiction that was established in Boumediene 
does not also give federal courts the power to order release into the United States 
and away from all potential forms of torture or unlawful treatment). Contra Brief 
of Legal Historians, supra note 172, at 6 (arguing that the logic of Kiyemba and 
Omar is flawed, and that in light of recent extradition cases and the ambiguity of 
the “meaningful review” standard, the Secretary of State’s declaration disposes of 
such cases on the merits and this could not be what CAT/FARRA contemplated). 
 212. See generally Stanton, supra note 86, at 896, 900 (explaining “ubi jus, ibi 
remedium, holds that ‘where there is a right, there is a remedy,’” and that the 
remedy is release). 
 213. See generally Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Decisions Detained: The Courts’ 
Embrace of Complexity in Guantánamo-Related Litigation, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L 
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of the importance of the federal courts in international extradition 
proceedings, as evidenced by the complexities of UNCAT 
compliance.214 One of the ways to do this is to observe the rationale 
that led to the outcome in the relevant habeas decisions, specifically 
Justice Kennedy’s remarks in Boumediene,215 and ask how that 
rationale can be applied in the present cases.216 The main principle 
that drove the Court to make its decision in Boumediene was the 
recognition of the need for an avenue through which noncitizen 
detainees could seek relief.217 This cannot be lost moving forward. 
B. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 
1. A Rule of Some Inquiry? 
Judge Thomas almost had us fooled in his Trinidad y Garcia 
concurrence: for a moment, it appeared that he might have a few 
choice words for the absence of review in alien extradition cases.218 
But we are inevitably reminded that it is solely within the 
Executive’s discretion to conduct foreign affairs.219 Judge Thomas’ 
L. 94, 94–95 (2011) (discussing not only the complexity of contemporary wartime 
jurisprudence with respect to complex constitutional principles, but explaining the 
link to and impact of indiscriminate executive power on the implementation of 
U.S. international policies). 
 214. See generally Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 955–56 (exemplifying the 
inherent connection between successful implementation of justice in international 
proceedings and the role of the federal courts). 
 215. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783. 
 216. See id. at 723 (rationalizing that the Executive could not have limitless 
power at the expense of fundamental constitutional rights). But see Trinidad y 
Garcia, 683 F.3d at 957 (remanding petitioner’s case to lower court to give the 
Secretary of State the opportunity to assert whether it is more likely than not, upon 
extradition, that the petitioner will be subject to torture or other cruel treatment, 
thus creating the precedent that “meaningful review,” contrary to Boumediene, 
means the executive signing a slip of paper that serves as an assurance). 
 217. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783. 
 218. Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 958–60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (opining, 
in the face of a skewed statutory interpretation, that neither REAL ID nor FARRA 
divest courts of their jurisdiction to grant habeas relief in extradition cases, and that 
detainees subject to extradition possess the right to judicial review under the 
Suspension Clause). 
 219. Id. at 961 (arguing instead that the doctrine of separation of powers 
prevents the court from questioning the Secretary of State’s internal extradition 
review, but adding that courts have the right to assess whether the Secretary of 
State is meeting her binding obligations under FARRA to conduct her review with 
due diligence). 
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concurring commentary effectively summarizes the general 
sentiment with respect to the relationship between the doctrine of 
separation of powers and nonrefoulement obligations. Because the 
Executive “possesses significant diplomatic tools and leverage the 
judiciary lacks,”220 the judiciary may not second-guess the merits of 
an extradition decision.221 
Circuit judges should seek a more functional balance between a 
necessary level of Executive deference in light of legitimate national 
security concerns and constitutionally required judicial review. 
Allowing some review in support of an anti-torture effort will not 
undermine the “Government’s ability to speak with one voice” on 
matters of international concern.222 As Judge Berzon proposed in her 
Trinidad y Garcia concurrence, a rule of “limited inquiry” would 
protect “against blatant violations of the Secretary’s [UN]CAT 
obligations as implemented by [FARRA].”223  
“The scope of habeas review is . . . not fixed. Rather, its proper 
application depends upon the circumstances in which it is to be 
applied.”224 Using Boumediene as a foundation, it is clear that 
meaningful review applies in extradition cases; thus, Judge Berzon’s 
suggestion that a rule of limited inquiry, which maintains a healthy 
level of Executive deference, is not only a viable balance,225 but also 
reflects that “the Executive’s authority to extradite is neither inherent 
 220. Id. (citing Munaf, 533 U.S. at 702). See generally Jennifer L. Milko, 
Separation of Powers and Guantanamo Detainees: Defining the Proper Roles of 
the Executive and Judiciary in Habeas Cases and the Need for Supreme Guidance, 
50 DUQ. L. REV. 173, 196 (2012) (supporting the need to strike a balance between 
the authority of the executive and the role of the judiciary in habeas proceedings). 
 221. Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 961 (Thomas, J., concurring) (recognizing 
the need for deference in extradition cases because of the Executive’s sole right to 
conduct foreign affairs). 
 222. Id. at 979 (Berzon, concurring) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (quoting Munaf, 
553 U.S. at 702). 
 223. Id. at 997, 989 (Berzon, J., concurring) (explaining that the Trinidad y 
Garcia majority makes the mistake of thinking that FARRA confers a purely 
procedural right, and further that a holding which merely “nudged the Executive 
toward refraining from sending persons abroad to face torture” would be 
“contradicting the view expressed—albeit in dicta—by the Supreme Court”). 
 224. Id. at 997. 
 225. See id. (comparing the closed proceedings in Boumediene to the torture 
determination in extradition cases, and explaining that the determination falls into 
the category of what Boumediene held required “more searching review”). 
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nor unlimited.”226 A rule of some inquiry would solve a twofold 
problem: first, it would put the United States in line with other 
countries that subject diplomatic assurances to at least some form of 
judicial review, and solve the UNCAT compliance problem by 
making an otherwise opaque process more transparent.227 Second, it 
would undo Trinidad y Garcia’s definition of “meaningful review” 
under Boumediene, and avoid collision with an extremely important 
precedent for noncitizen rights. 
2. Of Legislation: Amend FARRA 
Legislation regarding extradition and transfer is a contemporary 
tale told by the United States Courts of Appeals.228 The difficulties 
concerning REAL ID and FARRA could be solved if FARRA was 
amended to embody a clear avenue for recourse, to reflect the 
operable practices of other countries,229 and to be rid of any provision 
that might be interpreted to counter the statute’s very function.230 
Specifically, the statute should include a provision explicitly 
separating it from the streamlining provisions in REAL ID so that 
moving forward, detainees outside of the removal context will not be 
at the mercy of a material statutory misreading.231 
 226. Id. at 995. 
 227. See id. at 998 (supporting an inquiry into the substance of the Secretary’s 
extradition determination and an opportunity to assess her evidence and 
conclusions). See generally War, Terror, and the Federal Courts, supra note 66, at 
1269 (supporting the Supreme Court’s use of international law when interpreting 
the Constitution and legislation). 
 228. See generally Vladeck, D.C. Circuit Court Vitiates the Suspension Clause, 
supra note 54 (criticizing the D.C. Circuit’s recent rationale in Omar, specifically 
noting its apparent willingness to undermine Boumediene and in so doing, violate 
the Suspension Clause). 
 229. War, Terror, and the Federal Courts, supra note 66, at 1272 (“The difficult 
question comes when . . . a court is presented with the question whether to restrain 
the Executive in the conduct of war, and Congress has not done what it’s done so 
many times, which is to take the international law principle and put it into a statute, 
or to refer generally to international laws.”). 
 230. See Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 975 (Tallman, J., dissenting) (asserting 
that FARRA forecloses relief for detainees facing extradition and that the statute is 
not “an implementing tool” but rather “the mandate directing the promulgation of 
regulations that would implement the [UNCAT],” and, as such, does not impose a 
binding obligation on the Secretary of State). 
 231. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; see also Trinidad y Garcia, 683 
F.3d at 998 (discounting arguments for the disallowance of rights under FARRA, 
including any role of REAL ID in the inquiry, and stating that petitioners seeking 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The unavoidable realm of intersection between international and 
constitutional law demonstrates UNCAT noncompliance, as well as 
the dangerous tendency of our federal judiciary to defer to the 
Executive in the extradition context.232 Upon recognizing that a right 
to habeas relief is necessary under FARRA, and that such relief 
conclusively entails a right to meaningful review of the Executive’s 
extradition or transfer determination, it becomes clear that current 
practice has put the United States in derogation of its absolute 
nonrefoulement obligation under UNCAT as enforced through 
FARRA. Unfortunately, until a “congressional invitation”233 is 
extended to the judiciary, the Secretary’s signature will just have to 
suffice.  
 
review of the Secretary’s final extradition decision are entitled to a review of 
whether that decision is justified under UNCAT). 
 232. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 233. Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 967 (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
 
